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Abstract Monitoring the rule of law performance of EU member states presup-
poses that the EU has a clear idea of what is meant by the rule of law. Theoretically,
however, the conceptualization of this notion has proven difficult, leading to a wide
range of differing approaches. Moreover, the application of a common rule of law
concept in a multilevel legal context creates its own difficulties. As the starting point
for this contribution, we identify a core meaning of the rule of law based on the
work of Philip Selznick and Martin Krygier. They see the reduction of the arbitrary
use of power as the central value and point to the importance of a contextual
approach to realizing that value: reducing arbitrariness may require very different
concrete measures from one society to another. We examine what common idea of
the rule of law is projected by the European Union in its rule of law agenda, looking
specifically at two important instruments, the Justice Scoreboard and the Better
Regulation programme. Using the contextual approach to rule of law, we then
examine whether the core meaning of this concept is recognizable here, and whether
efforts are already made to allow for the inclusion of contextual elements. Our
analysis clarifies that the two instruments support the core notion of the rule of law
by enhancing the quality of political debates in the EU. However, underlying
economic assumptions and approaches as well as political forces form a constant
threat to the realization of elements of participation and separation of powers.
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1 Introduction
The rule of law is a fundamental value of the European Union (EU)1 and a criterion
for the accession of new Member States, requiring the guarantee of the
independence of their judiciary and the quality of legislation.2 However,
instruments developed with the aim of monitoring respect for the rule of law in
the EU’s Member States do not always seem to give a clear expression of the value
of the rule of law.
The aim of our paper is to conceptualize rule of law as a core value in the context
of EU monitoring instruments. In our paper, we depart from a twofold central
question: To what extent is a core notion of rule of law recognizable in EU
instruments to monitor the judiciary and to improve regulation, and what does it
mean to contextualize the rule of law with regard to these instruments? The first
building block of our approach is theoretical: building on a framework that sees rule
of law as a distinctive legal value that needs to be approached contextually. The
second building block is an account of two instruments in which rule of law values
should be at work: the Justice Scoreboard and the Better Regulation programme.
We chose these two instruments because they aim to improve two institutional
practices, judging and lawmaking, that are both core concerns of the European
Union. Moreover, they are sufficiently different to generalize the rule of law
approach beyond the concrete problems of judicial organization and regulatory
procedure. We will assess the way in which rule of law figures in these instruments
by way of three concrete questions derived from the theoretical framework: (1) Is
the core notion of rule of law as the reduction of the arbitrary exercise of power
recognizable in these instruments?; (2) If not or only in a rudimentary way, can the
core notion be linked to more specific elements of these instruments?; (3) What
room for contextualization do the instruments give?
We will first briefly discuss the theoretical framework. Next, we will present the
two instruments and study the rule of law aspects of these instruments, addressing
the three concrete questions formulated above. In the article’s concluding remarks,
we will reflect on the implications of our findings with regard to the realization of
the rule of law in the EU.
2 Theoretical Framework
Rule of law theories conceptualize the rule of law in a variety of ways.3 The debate
over formal versus substantive theories is by now well-known: the question whether
the rule of law only includes elements such as predictability and legality or also
substantive equality and human rights has not been resolved, although there are
1 Article 2 TEU.
2 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/policy-highlights/rule-of-law/index_en.htm. Accessed 17 February
2016.
3 Compare Tamanaha (2004).
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interesting positions trying to bridge the gap.4 What the contributions to the debate all
share is a focus on the elements or principles that the rule of law comprises. There is,
however, an alternative account which takes the purpose and value of the rule of law
as such as the central concern. The prime representative of this position is Martin
Krygier, who give a specific value-based, contextual account of the rule of law. His
theory relies heavily on the earlier work of Philip Selznick;5 both theories can be
labelled ‘teleological’ as their central concern is the telos or purpose the rule of law
serves.6 The theory is not only teleological, but draws heavily on socio-legal insights
as well. There are two main building blocks to the theory: the formulation of the
comprehensive ideal of the rule of law and the account of how context matters for the
rule of law. In Selznick’s words: ‘‘Only the analysis of particular institutions or social
spheres will tell us what rules and procedures are appropriate; and only then can we
take into account special needs and circumstances without shortchanging or
corrupting more comprehensive standards of legality and morality.’’7
The first pillar of the theory, which will be used as a criterion for assessment of
the EU instruments, is the formulation of the ideal or value of the rule of law. Both
Selznick and Krygier argue for the rule of law as a distinctive ‘master ideal’. In
Selznick´s work the ideal of legality or rule of law is the master ideal for the practice
of law.8 This means that we cannot understand law without its orientation towards
realization of that ideal. In slightly different terms, Krygier approaches the rule of
law by identifying its point or immanent purpose.9 Both formulate the central
meaning of the rule of law in terms of the reduction of arbitrariness: legal
instruments, such as, but not limited to, rules, should limit the possibility that those
in power exercise that power in an arbitrary way.10 For Selznick and Krygier, this is
a moral as well as a legal value, akin to Fuller’s internal morality of law.11 There are
subtle differences in formulation, however, which deserve attention because they
are relevant to the scope of the rule of law argument. Selznick repeatedly defined the
rule of law as the ‘progressive reduction of arbitrariness in positive law and its
administration’,12 which is a demanding, open-ended idea of law oriented towards
improvement of its realization of this ideal. Selznick stresses that this connects what
he calls ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ ideas of the rule of law,13 which we equate with
the formal and substantive elements. More importantly, the rule of law is taken as an
ideal that calls for ever-increasing realization. By contrast, Krygier emphasizes a
more modest notion of the rule of law, distinct from the other ‘good things’ law can
realize, and predominantly concerned with one problem: the arbitrary use of
4 Waldron (2008), Taekema (2013).
5 Selznick et al. (1969).
6 Krygier (2011), p. 68.
7 Selznick (2003), p. 181.
8 Selznick (1961), p. 94; Selznick et al. (1969), p. 11.
9 Krygier (2011), p. 75.
10 Ibid., p. 75.
11 Krygier (2011), pp. 76–77; Selznick et al. (1969), pp. 8–11.
12 Selznick (1961); Selznick et al. (1969), p. 12; Selznick (1999).
13 Selznick (1999), p. 24.
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power.14 Where Selznick sees a continuity between the rule of law and other values,
Krygier delineates the values that make up the rule of law itself from the benefits
that can follow from the rule of law for other values. Both approaches have merit.
We can agree with Selznick that it is difficult to draw the line between rule of law
and other values law serves, such as justice and equality. However, Krygier has a
good point that there are some values that seem to be an integral part of the rule of
law, while others can be distinguished from it, at least analytically, if not in practice.
In further fleshing out the theory, we therefore take the position that the reduction of
arbitrary exercise of power is central, but that this should be viewed progressively.
This entails that it is not enough to check whether a threshold of guarantees against
arbitrariness is passed, but that the potential for further realization of the rule of law
as also contributing to values with which it has affinity, such as democracy and
human rights, is investigated as well. The latter goal may sound overly ambitious,
but this ambition should be understood in light of the other building block of the
theory.
The second pillar of the theory is a commitment to a contextual understanding of
the rule of law. Both Selznick’s and Krygier’s basic commitment is to the study of
law in society, which is particularly relevant to the study of rule of law, because the
failure or success of rule of law projects depends only partly on the internal
workings of the legal system. If there is widespread corruption, having a legal
apparatus that limits the possibility of arbitrariness through its rules is of little use.15
This means that the societal context in which the law operates is a large factor in
understanding the rule of law more concretely. Selznick has shown that realization
of the rule of law depends greatly on the social and cultural setting in which the rule
of law is put to work. Interestingly, he did not limit his investigation of rule of law
to state institutions, but researched affinities with rule of law values in industrial
corporations.16 In the American context of the late 1960s there were developments
which supported realization of the rule of law in this non-state environment. Here,
the idea of progressive realization of the rule of law found a congenial setting. On
the other hand, he also highlights the possibility that a legal culture may be weak or
under threat.17 Krygier, in part by applying these kinds of arguments to the
problems of post-communist states, made the argument that the rule of law is
located in social traditions. This makes it very hard to introduce particular
institutions or forms of law, coming from a strong rule of law tradition, to a country
with a different legal culture to which the rule of law is alien.18 A contextual
approach to the rule of law needs to take these social and cultural backgrounds into
account: both the problems of the rule of law and the possible solutions are context-
dependent. Thus, we need to combine the formulation of the general value of the
14 Krygier (2012), p. 35; Krygier (2011), p. 75.
15 As they say in the Congo, ‘Why pay a lawyer, if you can buy a judge?’; as narrated by Dirk-Jan Koch,
describing his experience working for an NGO in De Congo Codes (2014).
16 Selznick et al. (1969).
17 Selznick (2003), p. 179.
18 Krygier (2009), pp. 69–70.
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rule of law with the socio-legal context in which it operates in order to figure out
what form of rule of law is appropriate.
If we then formulate the rule of law as the ideal of progressively reducing the
arbitrary exercise of power, we also need to sketch some more concrete, variable,
purposes that can serve as pointers for achieving the ideal. By unpacking the idea of
non-arbitrariness, we can identify four aspects.19 In literature on non-arbitrary
decision-making, a first central feature is the rationality of decisions: simply
deciding at will without good arguments makes decisions arbitrary.20 Whereas the
notion of reasoned decision-making applies to all exercise of power, the second
aspect of predictability applies specifically to rules. The third aspect is fairness in
concrete decision-making, i.e. when deciding upon individual cases administratively
or judicially, which requires a contextual assessment. The fourth aspect is
accountability to those affected, including the possibility to voice arguments or
complaints.21 All of these aspects are open-ended, matching Selznick’s idea of rule
of law as a progressive ideal. Although they do not directly proclaim substantive
values, they each point to central values, of moral reason, legal certainty, justice and
democracy, with which the rule of law has close affinity. The idea of reducing
arbitrariness is thus not only recognizable in the classic rule of law element of
predictability of rules. It also requires reasoned argument and sensitivity to the
context of the decision, and it requires possibilities for citizens to be part of the
process. The latter means including participation as a possible way to realize the
ideal. Including participation may seem surprising because it seems to include a
democratic element in the rule of law ideal, which is usually kept separate. We
understand it as the possibility of individuals to have a voice in legal procedures, at
different stages. With participation we therefore mean that power becomes less
arbitrary if there is genuine engagement of the powerful actor with the actors
affected by its conduct. Finally, the identification of these aspects of reduction of
arbitrariness leads us to an idea of balance of powers. Although this cannot be
derived from the meaning of reduction of arbitrariness as such, it is a crucial
condition in a legal order to make non-arbitrariness possible. Balance of powers, of
course, reintroduces an idea of trias politica: concentration of power, regardless of
the institution concerned, engenders opportunities for arbitrariness. A focus on
balance of powers rather than separation of powers seems preferable to achieve the
contextual embedding of the rule of law and aligns with the notion of
accountability.22 However, some elements of a stricter separation such as the
19 Cimini (2005) derives this list of four elements from the context of American administrative law.
Selznick associates rationality with a more positive, less rule-oriented, rule of law vision (1999, p. 27).
The other three aspects relate to principles in well-known lists [e.g. Bingham (2010); Raz (1979)].
20 There is also criticism of this element, Vermeule argues that under conditions of uncertainty this
requirement cannot be upheld and an unreasoned choice may be unavoidable A. Vermeule, ‘Rationally
Arbitrary Decisions (in Administrative Law)’, Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 13–24, 2013.
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2239155. Accessed 17 February 2016.
21 Waldron (2008). In a different theoretical framework, this element is seen as crucial within Global
Administrative Law (Kingsbury 2009).
22 Bellamy (2011) shows how balance of powers links to a republican rather than a liberal vision of
constitutionalism, in which political equality is central rather than freedom from interference. The notion
of accountability has close affinity with this vision.
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independence of judicial decision-making seem necessary in all legal orders. The
variability can be found in the ways in which institutional independence is reached,
which may need extra guarantees in cultures in which the rule of law is fragile.
With this elaboration of the rule of law in mind, the issue of realization of the
ideal needs to be addressed. How can the state of the rule of law be assessed? In rule
of law policy, attempts are made to measure rule of law performance of states or
agencies. The search for objective criteria is combined with a comparative focus:
where do rule of law measures succeed or fail? Rule of law measurement and
ranking is a salient feature of this development.23 Especially in the context of global
governance, the rule of law has made the list of issues assessed by way of indicators.
Our analysis can therefore also draw on the growing literature on the use of
indicators, of which the work of Davis, Merry and Kingsbury is the most relevant.24
They characterize indicators as follows: ‘An indicator is a named collection of rank-
ordered data that purports to represent the past or projected performance of different
units’.25 Indicators simplify raw data and are used to evaluate performance on the
basis of standards. In both of the EU instruments discussed in this article, indicators
matter: very directly in the Justice Scoreboard, which is an indicator-based
instrument, in different, more indirect ways in Better Regulation, which is used to
compare countries but also makes use of impact assessments which use indicators.
The Justice Scoreboard, firstly, is meant as a point of reference for the EU to
issue recommendations to Member States regarding the functioning of their justice
systems. The Better Regulation programme, secondly, provides guidelines to ensure
the quality of legislation developed by the EU institutions. In the next sections, we
will analyze to what extent these two instruments reflect the core notion of the rule
of law and give room for contextualization in connection with differences between
Member States regarding the realization of the rule of law ideal.
3 Assessing the Rule of Law Aspects of the Justice Scoreboard
This section first describes the main characteristics of the EU Justice Scoreboard.
Next, taking into account the three questions formulated in the Introduction of this
article, we will assess to what extent the core notion of the rule of law is
recognizable in the Justice Scoreboard or can be linked to specific elements of this
instrument. Furthermore, the compliance of the Scoreboard itself with this notion of
the rule of law will be examined, taking into account the role of contextualization to
fit the plurality of values and social contexts in the EU. Finally, we will address the
role of the Justice Scoreboard in monitoring the rule of law in EU Member States,
by analyzing the country-specific recommendations which were formulated for two
Member States (Hungary and Italy).
23 On a global scale, the most important one is the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index. For an
analysis, see Uruen˜a (2015). More generally on indicators Davis et al. (2012).
24 Merry et al. (2015); Davis et al. (2012).
25 Davis et al. (2012), p. 73.
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3.1 The Justice Scoreboard
On 9 March 2015, EU Commissioner Veˇra Jourova´, Commissioner for Justice,
Consumers and Gender Equality presented the Justice Scoreboard 2015. This third
edition builds further on the previous editions, which were published in 2013 and
2014. In the foreword of the 2015 Justice Scoreboard, Commissioner Jourova´
emphasizes the necessity of effective national justice systems ‘for enforcing the
Union’s laws in practice and contributing to economic growth’.26
The Scoreboard focuses on three indicators: efficiency, quality and indepen-
dence.27 Efficiency, firstly, is measured in terms of the length of proceedings, the
clearance rate and the number of pending cases. Quality, secondly, is connected to
improvement measures, e.g. training, monitoring, budget, human resources and the
availability of information technology and alternative dispute settlement. The
measurement of independence, thirdly, is held to concern legal safeguards for the
structural independence of national judiciaries. New elements introduced in the
2015 edition of the Scoreboard include the use of IT, the role of alternative dispute
resolution and the equal balance of male and female judges. Furthermore, the 2015
Justice Scoreboard includes the presentation of identified trends concerning the
three measured aspects of justice systems.28
The socio-legal context of Member States is taken into account in the Justice
Scoreboard in the following way. As a first step, the Scoreboard is based on
‘objective, reliable and comparable data’ concerning the functioning of the justice
systems of the Member States.29 Consecutively, the results from the analysis of data
are used in country-specific assessments in the framework of the EU’s economic
policy coordination (the European Semester), taking the form of bilateral
communication with authorities and stakeholders in Member States. In these
assessments, attention is paid to the particularities of the legal system and to the
context of each Member State. Based on the assessment, the European Commission
may give country-specific recommendations.30 Data concerning the justice systems
also played a role in the Economic Adjustment Programmes concerning Greece,
Portugal and Cyprus, which contained conditions related to justice reform.31 Despite
this room for contextualization, the 2015 Scoreboard emphasizes that minimum
requirements of efficiency, quality and independence should be met, regardless of
differences in workloads between the judiciaries of the Member States.32 It seems
that the Commission aims to use reports from the Member States regarding their
reforms to fine-tune the indicators used in the Scoreboard and to provide guidance
regarding activities that are common to more Member States.33
26 European Commission 2015, The 2015 EU Justice Scoreboard, COM(2015)116 final, Foreword.
27 2015 EU Justice Scoreboard, p. 6.
28 2015 Justice Scoreboard, p. 6.
29 Ibid., p. 5. See further below, Sect. 3.2.
30 Ibid., pp. 4–5.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., p. 6.
33 Ibid., p. 4.
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The number of Member States which receive country-specific recommendations
concerning the improvement of their justice system has steadily increased,
numbering six in 2012, ten in 2013 and twelve in 2014.34 Measures taken on the
basis of the recommendations concern the operation of justice systems, e.g.
modernization of management processes, use of information technology, develop-
ment of alternative dispute settlement and training of judges. They also concern
structural measures, e.g. restructuring of court organization or reform of civil
procedure.35
This far-reaching effect of the Justice Scoreboard on the organization of justice
systems, and on national economic policies, in the EU justifies an analysis of this
instrument in light of the ideal of the rule of law.
3.2 Recognition of the Core Notion of Rule of Law?
We have defined the rule of law as the ideal of progressive reduction of arbitrary
exercise of power, an ideal which encompasses the aspects of rationality,
predictability, fairness and accountability and the realization of which requires a
balance of powers. The core value of reducing arbitrariness is not explicitly
recognizable in the Justice Scoreboard. However, the notion of rule of law can be
identified in specific elements of the instrument, connected with the three indicators
of efficiency, quality and independence.
The connection of the notion of rule of law with elements of the Justice Scoreboard
is most clear with regard to the measurement of legal safeguards of structural
independence of the judiciary, which relates to the principle of balance of powers.
Further points of reference related to the judiciary’s institutional position can be
identified in elements which concern the preconditions for the adequate functioning of
justice systems, such as judicial training, human resources and budget. The Justice
Scoreboard also acknowledges the significance of the length of proceedings, essential
to the guarantee of a ‘fair trial’36 and therewith to curbing the arbitrary use of public
power. However, the connection with prevention of arbitrariness in justice systems is
less explicit with regard to the measurement of clearance rates, the number of pending
cases or the availability of information technology.
It is important to note that the presentation of the second version of the EU
Justice Scoreboard in March 2014 coincided with the adoption of a new Rule of
Law Framework by the European Commission. The then-President of the
Commission Barroso explained that the framework’s aim is to provide a more
adequate instrument for reacting to systemic threats to the rule of law in a specific
Member State, allowing avoidance of the harsher instrument of preventive or
sanctioning measures taken under Article 7 of the Treaty on the European Union.37
34 2014 EU Justice Scoreboard, p. 5; 2015 EU Justice Scoreboard, p. 4.
35 Ibid.
36 This notion can be connected to the requirement of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, which states that judgments should be handed down within a reasonable time.
37 Barroso, JMD 2014, ‘Remarks by President Barroso on the future of Justice and Home affairs and the
Rule of Law initiative’, press conference Strasbourg, 11 March 2014.
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The Framework clarifies that the Commission uses a broad definition of the rule of
law, based on the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU and the European Court
of Human Rights, and focusing on ‘a system where laws are applied and
enforced’.38
In the area of justice, measures taken in the past years include the development of
EU rights for victims of crime, stronger fair trial rights in criminal procedures and
personal data protection.39 These measures, focusing on access to justice and the
protection of private life, can be connected to the central meaning of the rule of law.
However, the Future Justice Agenda, presented by Commissioner Reding together
with the Rule of Law initiative, is less explicit about this legal value. It places the
rule of law in service of economic policy goals related to trust, mobility and
growth.40 This approach is visible also in the Justice Scoreboard, which puts
particular emphasis on the contribution of effective justice systems to economic
growth.
The European Commission has stated that it considers the Rule of Law
Framework and the Justice Scoreboard as two separate instruments. The Rule of
Law mechanism can be used by the Commission to actively support the guarantee of
the rule of law across Europe by addressing systemic threats to the rule of law in
Member States. It should be noted that the EC’s competence to act in this regard has
been challenged by the European Council and the effectiveness of the mechanism,
which leans on the expected outcomes of dialogue, has been put into question by
legal scholars.41 Indeed, the EC’s cautious approach in addressing rule of law
violations in Hungary and Poland in the past years can be criticized for its
inadequacy in dealing with regimes that deliberately choose to act against EU
values.42 The Justice Scoreboard might enable the EU to address shortcomings of
national justice systems in a different way. It is not an instrument specifically for
ensuring the guarantee of the rule of law.43 Yet, the Scoreboard provides data which
can be used by the Commission to recommend certain strategies to Member States
in the framework of economic policy coordination, which might benefit compliance
with the rule of law ideal.
Keeping this background to the instrument in mind, we will turn our attention to
the analysis of rule of law aspects in the practical experience with the Justice
Scoreboard. This analysis will first address the realization of the ideal of the rule of
38 European Commission 2014, ‘European Commission presents a framework to safeguard the rule of
law in the European Union’, press release Strasbourg, 11 March 2014.
39 V. Reding, ‘Towards a true European area of Justice: Strengthening trust, mobility and growth’, press
release Strasbourg, 11 March 2014, p. 3.
40 Ibid.
41 D. Kochenov and L. Pech, ‘From Bad to Worse? On the Commission and the Council’s Rule of Law
Initiatives’, EU Law Analysis, 19 January 2015, available at eulawanalysis.blogspot.nl.
42 Regarding Hungary, see Sect. 3.4.1 below. Regarding Poland, the Commission has initiated a dialogue
with the Member State under the new ‘pre-Article 7 procedure’. See European Commission 2016,
‘College Orientation Debate on recent developments in Poland and the Rule of Law Framework:
Questions & Answers’, fact sheet Brussels, 13 January 2016.
43 European Commission 2014, ‘The 2014 EU Justice Scoreboard: Questions & Answers’, memo
Brussels, 17 March 2014.
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law in the production of the Justice Scoreboard and next the realization of this ideal
in the formulation of country-specific recommendations by the European
Commission.
3.3 Assessing the Production of the Justice Scoreboard
In order to establish the EU Justice Scoreboard, quantitative data from the Council
of Europe’s Commission for the Evaluation of the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) are
combined with information from inter alia the World Bank, the European Network
of Councils for the Judiciary and pilot field studies on consumer and competition
law.44
As a first point of criticism, it is unclear how the definitions of ‘efficiency’,
‘quality’ and ‘independence’, applied by the Justice Scoreboard, have been
established. The 2013 EU Justice Scoreboard merely presents these three elements
as standard indicators defined by CEPEJ and directs readers to the CEPEJ website
for a further explanation.45 This argumentation comes across as rather weak.
Notwithstanding the undoubted quality and authority of CEPEJ research, it might be
expected of the drafters of the Justice Scoreboard to provide a stronger justification
of the selection of indicators in light of the rule of law framework of the EU. In this
regard, the rule of law aspect of rationality, in the sense of reasoned decision-
making, could have been realized to a fuller extent in the production of the Justice
Scoreboard.
This criticism becomes even more pertinent when considering the balancing of
rule of law values and economic values, which underlies choices for the
organization of justice systems.46 Improvements of justice systems on the basis of
evaluations such as the Justice Scoreboard can only be achieved if the actors
involved in the development of reforms and practices share a common set of values
regarding ethical behavior and good government.47 Concerning the functioning of
justice systems, the optimal use of scarce resources is a matter of common interest
to governments, judges, court managers and citizens alike. Economic values and
rule of law values overlap for example regarding the guarantee of timeliness of
judgments.48 However, the interests of different actors can diverge in other respects,
for example concerning the degree of autonomy which should be granted to
individual judges in organizing their case management.49 The contextual assessment
of this balancing of values might lead to a different definition of the three indicators
for the EU than for the Council of Europe, which represent different geographical
spheres, different motives for transnational cooperation and different models of
governance. For this reason, it can be argued that the EU should develop its proper
44 2015 EU Justice Scoreboard, p. 5.
45 European Commission 2013, The 2013 EU Justice Scoreboard, COM(2013)160 final, p. 4.
46 See Mak (2008).
47 Mohr and Contini (2014), p. 851.
48 Ibid., pp. 849 and 851; see also Mak (2008), p. 733.
49 Mak (2008), p. 730.
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indicators for the Justice Scoreboard, based on EU values, in order to enable a
contextualized assessment of each Member State’s justice system.
The Scoreboard’s methodology has been criticized further for its inaccurate use
of data, in particular concerning the use of information on national justice systems
collected by CEPEJ. CEPEJ’s data collection regarding judicial reforms and
practices in Member States of the Council of Europe is established on the basis of
different national research approaches and is specifically meant to provide an
overview only.50 The Scoreboard presents this CEPEJ information in the form of a
ranking of justice systems and without a clarification of the differences between
national research approaches. In this way, relevant aspects of comparative
methodology as well as contextual explanations for the data concerning each
Member State are overlooked.51 In light of our presented framework for achieving
the ideal of the rule of law, this criticism can be connected with the aspect of
fairness. After all, a fair account and comparison of the justice systems of the EU
Member States requires that data are sufficiently contextualized.
With regard to accountability and participation, the interaction between the
European Commission and Member States is of importance. The European
Commission has organized cooperation with the Member States regarding the
Justice Scoreboard in an informal group of contact persons, composed of a
representative of the judiciary and a representative of the ministry of Justice from
each Member State. This group was established in 2013 in order to facilitate the
collection of data for the Scoreboard and ‘to promote the exchange of best practices
on the effectiveness of justice systems’.52 The input of this group in the collection of
data for the Justice Scoreboard is mentioned for the first time in the methodology of
the 2015 Scoreboard.53
Notwithstanding the Commission’s efforts, the cooperation of Member States in
collecting data for the Justice Scoreboard has problematic aspects. Firstly, there is
no check on the accuracy of the presented data. Moreover, Member States can be
less inclined to cooperate with the EU if they think they lack ‘ownership’ regarding
the processing, interpretation and analysis of data.54 Indeed, it appears that some
Member States were less willing to provide information for the 2014 EU Justice
Scoreboard than they were for the 2013 Scoreboard. An unattributed EU source
admitted to the EUobserver, an independent online newspaper, that ‘[i]n certain
graphs, it is true that we have less data’.55 This incompleteness of the used data
undermines the rationality of conclusions derived from the study of the Justice
Scoreboard. A further analysis reveals that the problem is substantial. Data on
certain matters reported on in 2010 was not delivered concerning 2012 by six
Member States: Cyprus, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, Romania and Spain.
50 Mohr and Contini (2014), p. 846.
51 Ibid., pp. 848–847.
52 2015 EU Justice Scoreboard, p. 4, footnote 7.
53 Ibid., p. 5.
54 Serban (2015), p. 217.
55 N. Nielsen, ‘EU Justice Scoreboard Upsets Some Member States’, EUobserver, 17 March 2014,
available at euobserver.com.
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Three of these Member States, namely Hungary, Romania and Spain, had received
recommendations on the basis of the 2013 Scoreboard.56 Cyprus participated in an
Economic Adjustment Programme, in which conditions set by the EU were
connected to justice reforms in the Member State.57 The UK refuses to provide
information for the Justice Scoreboard altogether.58 The UK Justice Secretary Chris
Grayling has defended this refusal on the basis of criticism of the EU’s approach
regarding the Scoreboard. He questioned the competence of the European
Commission to produce the Scoreboard as well as the usefulness of the instrument
besides arguably more effective reports of the Council of Europe’s CEPEJ.59
Furthermore, Grayling criticized the unresponsiveness of the European Commission
with regard to reservations of Member States concerning the Scoreboard, expressed
in the EU Justice and Home Affairs Council.60
3.4 Assessing Country-Specific Recommendations Based on the Justice
Scoreboard
Rule of law aspects in the application of the Justice Scoreboard to EU Member
States, and the role of contextualization in this regard, come to the fore in the
country-specific recommendations developed in the framework of the European
Semester.61 These recommendations have a basis in Article 121 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the EU. However, this legal framework leaves a large margin of
discretion to the European Commission and European Council in deciding on the
degree of detail of recommendations for different Member States and on the
consequences in case a Member State does not follow up on the recommendations.62
Also, it is not clear to what extent Member States need to justify actions taken or the
absence of action with regard to recommendations. In these two respects, the
rationality of decision-making regarding the improvement of justice systems in the
EU can be criticized.
Regarding participation, a noteworthy difference in the 2015 Scoreboard when
compared with the 2014 document concerns the description of the interaction
between the Commission and the Member States. The 2014 Scoreboard mentioned
the Commission’s role in identifying justice as a priority area for the Member States
which received recommendations.63 The 2015 Scoreboard describes the interaction
between the Commission and the Member States as a dialogue and emphasizes the
autonomy of the Member States in setting their funding priorities, taking into
56 2014 EU Justice Scoreboard, p. 6.
57 2015 EU Justice Scoreboard, p. 2, footnote 1.
58 Nielsen, see above n. 54.
59 European Scrutiny Committee of the House of Commons 2014 (35888) 7910/14 (30 April 2014).
60 Ibid.
61 See above, Sect. 3.1.
62 European Commission 2015, ‘Q&A: Country-specific recommendations 2015’, fact sheet Brussels, 13
May 2015.
63 2014 EU Justice Scoreboard, p. 6.
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account the country-specific recommendations regarding their justice system.64 This
change of approach might be related to the resistance against the Scoreboard
expressed in the refusal of several Member States to provide data regarding their
national justice systems.
Hungary and Italy constitute two illustrative cases for clarifying the rule of law
aspects in the application of the Justice Scoreboard. Both Member States have
received country-specific recommendations in consecutive years regarding the
improvement of their justice systems.
3.4.1 Hungary
The ranking of Hungary in the 2013 EU Justice Scoreboard, in which the country
did well especially with regard to the length of proceedings65 and relatively well
with regard to judicial independence,66 was met with surprise. Then-EU Commis-
sioner Reding explained that the data used in the 2013 Scoreboard concerned the
judicial system of Hungary in 2010, before the significant constitutional amendment
of 2011 and important judicial reforms took place.67 A further analysis clarifies,
however, that the Justice Scoreboard currently is not sufficiently equipped for
identifying failures in the Member State’s realization of the rule of law in its
national justice system.
In the past years, Prime-Minister Orba´n’s Fidesz government has drawn attention
with controversial reforms regarding the retirement age of judges and the
competences of the President of the National Judicial Office concerning case
allocation and the transfer of judges as well as with the appointment of ‘friends’ of
the Fidesz party on important institutional positions.68 The European Commission
started infringement procedures against Hungary in 2012 under Article 258 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union for violating its obligations under
EU law. This alleged violation concerned inter alia the lowering of the retirement
age of judges from 70 to 62 without an objective justification.69
Based on the Commission’s assessment of the national situation, Hungary was
one of the ten Member States which received country-specific recommendations in
the follow-up of the 2013 Justice Scoreboard. The Commission’s recommendations
for Hungary concerning the period 2013–2014 included the advice to ‘[a]ddress
concerns about the independence of the judiciary’ and related this recommendation
64 2015 EU Justice Scoreboard, p. 4.
65 2013 EU Justice Scoreboard, pp. 6–11.
66 Ibid., p. 21. Hungary ranked at nr. 72 out of 144 countries in the world concerning judicial
independence generally and nr. 32 out of 97 countries in the world concerning the independence of civil
justice. The source of these data was the World Economic Forum.
67 N. Nielsen, ‘Hungary in Surprise Ranking on EU Justice Scoreboard’, EUobserver, 27 March 2013,
available at euobserver.com.
68 Ibid.
69 European Commission 2012, ‘European Commission launches accelerated infringement proceedings
against Hungary over the independence of its central bank and data protection authorities as well as over
measures affecting the judiciary’, press release Strasbourg, 17 January 2012. See also Gyo¨ngyi (2013),
p. 13.
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to more general advice concerning the creation of a ‘supportive business
environment’.70 Interestingly, in 2014 and 2015, Hungary was absent from the
list of countries which received recommendations concerning the national justice
system.71 This might be explained by the ‘other road’ taken by the Commission with
regard to Hungary, i.e. the initiation of infringement procedures.72 However, the
absence of recommendations could also be linked to the inaccuracy or incomplete-
ness of presented data in the Justice Scoreboard. In the 2014 EU Justice Scoreboard,
Hungary’s performance was assessed as relatively good regarding efficiency and
quality of the justice system in comparison with the other Member States.
Concerning judicial independence, only the perception as measured by the World
Economic Forum was taken into account by the Scoreboard.73 In 2015, research
regarding this indicator was expanded to include a comparative overview of
structural independence. However, part of the presented information was not
collected by the EU itself but instead derived from a study by the European Network
of Councils for the Judiciary.74 An assessment of Hungary’s relative performance
can be found in the 2015 Justice Scoreboard with regard to two aspects only,
notably not including the composition of the Council for the Judiciary.75 Moreover,
the presented data for this indicator provide relatively little guidance for Member
States regarding the most suitable way of organizing their national judicial system
in order to realize judicial independence. In this respect, the absence of clear
similarities regarding legal safeguards could explain the short and rather vague
nature of the conclusions regarding judicial independence76 in comparison to the
conclusions concerning efficiency and quality of justice systems.77
A shortcomingof the JusticeScoreboard in relation to the ideal of the rule of law,which
presents itself here, is the implicit assumption that constitutional values regarding the
balance of powers and political respect for the judiciary’s position are well-established in
the EU Member States. If this were true, the Scoreboard could operate as an adequate
instrument for enhancing notions of efficiency and quality of justice. However, the
Hungarian case shows that this assumption is mistaken and makes clear how instruments
such as the current Scoreboard, in consequence of a false basic assumption, fail to identify
serious flaws in the realizationof a national justice systemwhich lives up to the ideal of the
rule of law. This case underlines the importance of contextualization and a weakness of
analyses using indicators as a point of reference: ‘Although checklist-based rule-of-law
indicatorsmayseemanadvanceover fuzzydefinitions, only forensic legal analysis can tell
how a constitutional order works in practice.’78
70 COM(2013)367 final, p. 7.
71 2015 EU Justice Scoreboard, p. 4; COM(2015)266 final.
72 See most recently European Commission 2015, ‘Commission opens infringement procedure against
Hungary concerning its asylum law’, press release Brussels, 10 December 2015.
73 2014 EU Justice Scoreboard, p. 26.
74 2015 EU Justice Scoreboard, p. 37.
75 Ibid., pp. 37 and 41.
76 Ibid., p. 43.
77 Ibid., pp. 19 and 36.
78 See also Lane Scheppele 2013, p. 562.
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3.4.2 Italy
Italy received country-specific recommendations concerning the national justice
system in 2012, 2013 and 2014.79 In its 2013 Recommendation, the European
Commission observed: ‘Completing the civil-justice reform by swiftly implement-
ing the revision of courts’ organization and reducing the excessive duration of case-
handling, court backlogs and high level of litigation is necessary to improve the
business environment.’80 Furthermore, the Commission noted the need of further
promotion of alternative dispute settlement and the need to effectively fight against
corruption.81 The Commission recommended inter alia timely implementation of
reforms through legislation and executive action, reinforcement of public admin-
istration and reduction of the length of court proceedings.82 The Commission
observed in 2014 that the identified inefficiencies had not been resolved and
recommended a timely monitoring of implemented reforms.83
The Commission’s country report on Italy’s macroeconomic situation, presented
in February 2015, includes the observation that ‘[d]espite marginal improvements,
inefficiencies in the public administration and justice remain. According to several
national and international sources, corruption is high, which damages the
economy’.84 The Commission recognizes that some improvements to the justice
system have been achieved, including a reform of the judicial map, the increase of
specialization within the court system and the introduction of mandatory mediation
in certain civil and commercial cases.85 The first experiences seem promising, in
particular concerning the use of digital means. Still, the Commission finds that no
clear efficiency gains are visible with regard to the backlog of cases and concludes
that Italy’s business environment, for this reason, is not sufficiently open to foreign
investment.86
This case, similar to the case of Hungary, clarifies that the socio-legal context of
Member States is taken into account only in a superficial manner in the application
of the Justice Scoreboard. No precise recommendations are formulated for example
regarding the most suitable way of fighting corruption in the Italian judicial system.
Once more, the analysis reveals limitations of the Justice Scoreboard related to the
incompleteness of information on certain matters and the absence of a contextual
analysis of the comparative findings. Because of these weaknesses, the Scoreboard
does not provide clear practical or normative guidance to the Member States
concerning the improvement of their justice systems. This case study of Italy, like
the study on Hungary, further indicates that the Commission makes more
recommendations concerning the enhancement of the efficiency of the justice
79 See EU Justice Scoreboards of 2013, 2014 and 2015.
80 COM(2013)362 final, p. 4.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid., p. 7.
83 COM(2014)413 final, pp. 5 and 7.
84 SWD(2015)31 final, p. 2.
85 Ibid., p. 50.
86 Ibid., p. 51.
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system than concerning the guarantee of judicial independence. This difference
supports the hypothesis that, in cases of conflicting values,87 the instrument of the
Scoreboard focuses more (and possibly too much) on the promotion of economic
values than on the guarantee of the value of the rule of law in the EU.
3.5 Analysis and Conclusions Concerning the Justice Scoreboard
The functioning of the justice systems of Member States is of importance for the
effective implementation of EU law by the courts in Member States, which are the
‘decentralized Community judges’.88 More generally, justice systems are important
for the guarantee of effective judicial protection to citizens and businesses,
protected by article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and part of
the constitutional traditions common to the Member States.89 However, the analysis
of the EU Justice Scoreboard clarifies that this instrument does not so much connect
with constitutional values related to the interests of citizens, such as the right to an
effective judicial remedy and a fair trial, but rather emphasizes neo-liberal values
related to the interests of businesses. Indeed, the EU Justice Scoreboard connects
justice reforms to the aim ‘to improve business climate and to overcome the
sovereign debt and financial crisis’.90 The application of this instrument in
economic policy coordination, in combination with the EC’s reluctance to apply the
Rule of Law framework for addressing systemic threats to the rule of law in
Member States, gives cause for concern regarding the realization of the rule of law
ideal in the justice systems within the EU.
When connecting the analysis of the EU Justice Scoreboard to the specific
aspects of the ideal of the rule of law regarding ‘progressive development’,
‘participation’ and ‘balance of powers’, the following concluding observations can
be made.
Firstly, the purpose of the Justice Scoreboard fits with the ideal of the rule of law
in the sense that the collection of data regarding national justice systems is used to
formulate suggestions for improvement. That is: the instrument aims at achieving
progress. However, progress in the sense of improvement of justice systems can
only be achieved on the basis of reliable, comprehensive and comparable data
concerning the Member States. The methodology for the production of the Justice
Scoreboard raises concerns in this regard, because the Scoreboard relies to a large
extent on secondary sources of information while differences concerning national
research approaches and concerning the contextual analysis of data are not
sufficiently acknowledged. The more robust methodology used in data collection for
the Rule of Law Index, developed by the World Justice Project, could serve as an
example in this respect.91
87 See above, Sect. 3.2.
88 Amtenbrink and Vedder (2013).
89 European Commission 2014, The 2014 EU Justice Scoreboard, COM 2014, 155 final, p 2.
90 2014 EU Justice Scoreboard, p 3; see also 2015 EU Justice Scoreboard, p 2.
91 See Uruen˜a (2015), p. 82.
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Secondly, the European Commission performs relatively well regarding the
realization of the ideal of the rule of law through participation. With regard to the
production of the EU Justice Scoreboard, the involved actors include national and
European governments and judicial authorities as well as experts within the national
judiciaries and ministries of Justice and researchers involved in field studies on the
organizational setting of application of EU law by national courts. Still, the applied
methodology and cooperation with Member States require improvement. Moreover,
the role and influence of all of these actors needs to be scrutinized in order to
confront the risk of capture of the debate by a specific actor. In particular, the data
consulted concerning the perception of the judiciary by civil society, such as a
survey conducted by the World Economic Forum, currently might focus too much
on the views of businesses and take insufficient account of the views of citizens.
Finally, the contribution of the Justice Scoreboard regarding the curbing of
arbitrary use of power can be criticized. In particular, the indicators of ‘efficiency’,
‘quality’ and ‘independence’ do not seem adequate with regard to the realization of
the rule of law in terms of a balance of powers. The three indicators focus on
economic values and quantifiable information and leave aside justice-related and
qualitative aspects concerning for example the fairness of proceedings or the
comprehensibility of judgments. For this reason, the Justice Scoreboard gives only
partial insight into the realization of the ideal of the rule of law in EU Member
States. This limitation is demonstrated in the follow-up on the Scoreboard with
regard to Hungary and Italy. A long list of recommendations is presented for Italy,
focusing on inefficiencies in the organization of court proceedings and the
detrimental effect of these inefficiencies for business and investment. By contrast,
Hungary has received no more than one general recommendation to address
concerns regarding judicial independence, despite the ‘imbalance’ of powers
resulting from the Fidesz party’s control of the political and legal system. In this
regard, the Commission’s action is at odds with the criticism and pressure exerted
through infringement procedures initiated against Hungary on the basis of the EU
Treaties. The distinction made between the EU’s Rule of Law Framework and the
Justice Scoreboard seems artificial in this respect. What signal is given to a Member
State if it ranks well in the Scoreboard, inter alia in terms of legal safeguards for the
independence of the judiciary, while clear failures to uphold judicial independence
in practice can be identified in the Member State’s political and social context?
4 Assessing the Rule of Law Aspects of Better Regulation
Complementary to the monitoring of justice systems by The Justice Scoreboard,
Better Regulation is a programme focussing on the regulatory task of the EU and its
Member States. Here too, assessment from a rule of law perspective seems
warranted, because the quality of legislation, and rulemaking more broadly, may
clearly contribute to non-arbitrariness in the sense discussed above.
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4.1 Better Regulation Programme
The Better Regulation programme was initiated by the European Commission in
2001 to improve the quality of EU legislation. The programme focusses on
improving procedures of lawmaking in a number of ways. A central element of the
programme is the instrument of impact assessment (IA), which can be defined as
‘the systematic and thorough ex ante assessment of proposals for policies or
legislation, covering impacts that are external to government, often making use of
economic tools such as cost-benefit analysis’.92 Other elements include public
consultation, ex-post evaluation and reduction of administrative burdens.93
Following the 2002 Action Plan on Better Regulation, which aimed to develop ‘a
common legislative culture within the Union’, Member States have developed new
regulatory policies and cooperated in particular in the IA framework.94 More
recently, what is now labeled ‘smart regulation’ by the European Commission has
come to include elements which focus primarily on reducing the complexity and
burdens of regulation for businesses and citizens; the Regulatory Fitness and
Performance Programme is the primary umbrella for this.95 The commitment of the
European Commission to better regulation is also evident in the appointment of
Commissioner Timmermans as a First Vice-President in charge of better regulation,
inter-institutional relations, rule of law and human rights, with the particular brief of
coordinating better regulation within the Commission.96
Better Regulation as such does not have a basis in the European Treaties; it is a
policy strategy to coordinate and rationalize the European Union’s regulatory
efforts.97 While Better Regulation has a clear economic goal in terms of ensuring
competitive market strategies, it also expresses standards for the legitimate exercise
of public power.98 However, with regard to the latter aspect it is not entirely clear
how Better Regulation, based on requirements of public administration, relates to
constitutional requirements of legislative acts. From the perspective of the rule of
law, a point of concern is that Better Regulation focuses on substantive and formal
tests of procedures in terms of economic and public administration criteria, but
seems to ignore the constraining function of public law on rule-making. Whereas
this framework could foster the deliberative element in procedures, it might not
provide sufficient constraints on the influence of powerful private stakeholders.99 As
a central instrument for the accountability of EU regulation, Better Regulation
merits further scrutiny in terms of rule of law.
92 Meuwese and Popelier (2011), p. 456.
93 European Commission 2014, ‘Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme (REFIT): State of Play
and Outlook’, Communication COM(2014)368 final, pp. 13–15.
94 Meuwese and Popelier (2011), p. 456.
95 COM(2014)368.
96 F. Ferraro, Briefing for the hearings of European Commissioners-designate, First Vice-President
Timmermans. European Parliamentary Research Service, PE 532.921, 2014.
97 Radaelli and Meuwese (2010), p. 143.
98 Meuwese and Popelier (2011), p. 457.
99 Ibid., p. 458.
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In order to make a meaningful assessment of Better Regulation in terms of the
rule of law, it is fruitful to turn to the fairly extensive research done, especially on
regulatory impact assessments, from a political science and regulatory studies
perspective. As said, Better Regulation is a policy initiative by the European
Commission bureaucracy, and this provenance is accompanied by a decided
dominance in research of disciplines focusing on policy and administration. The
advantage of using these studies is that significant empirical work can be drawn
upon which analyzes both the quality and the use of impact assessments.100 It does
require a further analysis in terms of rule of law, by assessing what the findings
mean in terms of reduction of arbitrariness, especially in the exercise of power.
Although explicit acknowledgment of the rule of law as a distinctive and
overarching value for regulation is absent, as is to be expected in such a broad
public administration agenda, other concerns can be taken as a basis for
involvement of rule of law values. As in the discussion of the Justice Scoreboard,
we will consider whether the core notion of the rule of law is recognizable in Better
Regulation and to what extent context-sensitivity is part of it. In relation to Better
Regulation we assess the particular instruments of impact assessment and public
consultation in terms of rule of law in three ways.101 We investigate the idea that
impact assessments can increase rationality and predictability of decision-making,
the importance of balance of powers in the use of impact assessments, and the place
of public consultations both in the impact assessments themselves and in EU policy
more generally. The idea of increasing predictability aligns the policy with the
formal aspect of the rule of law: the classic notion that the subjects of the law (or
regulation) know what to expect. Balance of powers plays an important role as a
check on arbitrary power, as explained in Sect. 2, and is highly relevant in the
politically charged context of making regulation. Thirdly, public consultation is a
form of participation which can be seen as a (limited) form of constraining power,
because it requires that regulators take the arguments of subjects seriously. The use
of consultation can be connected most directly to the contextualization of the rule of
law.
4.2 The Character and Goals of Impact Assessment in the Context of Better
Regulation
To start with the character of impact assessment as such, it is evident that the main
idea behind it is the rationalization of policy choices, and as such it can be viewed as
an effort to reduce arbitrariness in policymaking.102 Rationality here takes on a
specific meaning: regulatory impact assessments (RIA) predominantly make use of
methodologies of cost-benefit analysis and assessment of administrative burdens.103
There is a definite push towards streamlining Better Regulation in European states,
100 E.g. Cecot et al. (2008), Hertin et al. (2009), Dunlop et al. (2012).
101 The aspect of fairness distinguished in Sect. 2 is not included, because it is less relevant in the context
of adopting general rules.
102 Alemanno (2011), p. 486.
103 Hertin et al. (2009), p. 417.
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with the OECD as a main driving force. The OECD regularly monitors Better
Regulation programmes and has clear preferences for a uniform Better Regulation
policy supervised by a national agency.104 The methodology of RIA is to score costs
and benefits by attaching numerical values to criteria and ranking alternatives.105
Much then depends on the quality of data processing in a particular RIA, which may
differ greatly.106 In the study of Cecot et al., the quality of EU impact assessments is
evaluated by making use of a similar economic methodology as the assessments
themselves, measuring quality in terms of the inclusion of quantified data in the
impact assessment.107 Thus, the importance of quantifiable data in impact
assessment is assumed rather than evaluated in its own right. Rationality of
regulatory procedure then employs a particular version of reasoned decision-
making, namely basing analysis on quantifiable standardized data.
From a rule of law perspective, the value of the standard methodologies of impact
assessment is an open question, in part because the quality of the executed impact
assessments is variable.108 However, even if the quality of the impact assessments
themselves is good, and it does seem to improve,109 the relevance of quality in terms
of the rule of law may be limited. If a good assessment is shelved or ignored by
policy makers, its quality does nothing to enhance the predictability of regulation.
Achievement of predictability depends much more on the use that is made of impact
assessments.
4.3 Uses of Impact Assessment
How impact assessments are used, shifts the focus to the different actors involved
and the issue of balance of powers. For this rule of law issue, we can draw on a body
of research from policy studies. A meta-analysis of 31 case studies in the UK and
EU110 uses a framework of four usages of regulatory impact assessment (RIA):
‘political, instrumental, communicative, and perfunctory usages’.111 It turns out that
the different usages overlap, and that the actors involved in the implementation of
RIA have significant influence on the outcomes of the process.112 For instance, a
stakeholder that sees the content of the RIA as detrimental to its interests can
104 The OECD completed their EU 15 project in 2012, in which it assessed Better Regulation in the
original 15 EU member states (OECD 2008, Better Regulation in Europe: An OECD assessment of
regulatory capacity in the 15 original member states of the EU. Project objectives, methodology, process,
output, at http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/44952962.pdf. Accessed 17 February 2016). This
was preceded by a review of the 12 then ‘new’ member states of the EU.
105 The OECD advises on how to conduct an RIA (OECD 2008, Introductory Handbook for Undertaking
Regulatory Impact Analysis, at www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/44789472.pdf. Accessed 17
February 2016). For a critical analysis of RIA, see Hertin et al. (2009).
106 Hertin et al. (2009).
107 Cecot et al. (2008), p. 406.
108 Ibid., p. 420.
109 Ibid., p. 412.
110 Dunlop et al. (2012).
111 Ibid., p. 23.
112 Ibid., p. 40.
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politicize the use of the RIA, sometimes going so far as to order a counter-RIA.113
Many RIAs are perceived as simply fulfilling a formal requirement, with the policy
already having been adopted or taken elsewhere: the perfunctory usage.114 These
findings raise questions about the balance of powers of the actors involved in these
processes: who can have a decisive influence, who can counter that influence, etc.?
From a policy perspective, the answers are mainly interesting as an empirical
matter, but for the rule of law we need to ask whether it is possible to institutionalize
such powers and counter-powers. In some contexts, this seems to be possible:
Radaelli and Meuwese show how the introduction of impact assessments by the
European Commission, which was meant to enhance the transparency of EC
proposals for Parliament and Council,115 had the effect of creating a new balance
among the Directorates-General within the bureaucracy of the European Commis-
sion. By requiring the inclusion of impacts on business, environment, health etc. the
procedure facilitates, what they call, ‘partisan mutual adjustment’ because each
Directorate-General makes the case for the interest that is part of its own policy
field.116 Although this is not the standard way of looking at balance of powers, it
seems to reduce the ad-hoc character of policymaking and may therefore be
beneficial in terms of rule of law. However, from a broader institutional perspective
this may be problematic, because it further strengthens the role of the European
Commission. If the expertise required for carrying out impact assessments is
concentrated at the Commission, the other actors such as Parliament and Council
may regard this as threatening and disregard the impact assessment for that reason
only.117 Thus, a costly impact assessment which might have been a good
contribution to the decision-making process, may become a barrier. Ownership of
the impact assessment is therefore important: if it is used strategically by the agency
submitting the proposal to bolster its policy choice, it may be counterproductive.118
One way to minimize this danger is by including consultation in the process of
impact analysis.
4.4 Public Consultation
This brings us to the third issue, the role of consultation. Public consultation seems
positive for rule of law values: casting the net for participation wide (for instance by
the introduction of online consultation) this instrument is geared to enhance
accountability of lawmaking. Here, the European Union is at the forefront of
developments by making systematic use of consultation mechanisms.119 In 2014, a
113 Ibid., p. 34.
114 Ibid., p. 35.
115 Radaelli and Meuwese (2010), p. 140.
116 Ibid., p. 147.
117 Compare Dunlop et al. (2012).
118 Hertin et al. (2009), p. 418.
119 Compare Hertin et al. (2009), p. 419.
The European Union’s Rule of Law Agenda: Identifying Its… 45
123
public consultation was held on the new guidelines for impact assessment.120 The
openness to stakeholder views is again affirmed as one of the fundamental principles
of impact assessment. However, recent research on the use of open consultation by
the European Commission shows that stakeholder engagement is biased towards
business and industry representatives.121 Although there is no procedural barrier
against participation by citizens and civil society organizations, they lack the means,
importantly financial means, to engage seriously and repeatedly.122 This is one
reason why other forms of stakeholder engagement than open consultation may be
preferable; Brown and Scott point to the establishment of ‘standing panels’ of
stakeholders for policy fields as a better way of achieving real dialogue.123 The issue
of consultation may be the most direct concern for a contextual approach to the rule
of law. Standard procedures at the EU are open to democratic participation but the
culture of lobbying and the presence of industrial and business interests is such that
much more needs to be done for the absence of citizens and NGOs to be addressed.
Here, the sociological approach that Krygier and Selznick advocate seems highly
necessary: progress in terms of the participatory aspect of the rule of law can only
be made if the cultural base for participation is strengthened. However, drawing on
Selznick we may need to be cautious here: if there is no potential for an alternative
way of involving stakeholders, setting out rules and procedures is futile. Given the
dominance of lobbyists and experts, much would be required to foster change,
including sustained attention for rule of law values as applying to private actors as
well.124 Additionally, the broader discourse on regulation may need to change:
moving away from the reductive discussion of red tape and administrative costs to a
broader discussion of the values that matter to European citizens.
4.5 Analysis and Conclusions Concerning Better Regulation
Better Regulation is a relevant concern if we regard rule of law as reducing arbitrary
exercise of power. Regulatory power is the main manifestation of the power of
public actors such as the European Commission, so assessment of it in terms of rule
of law values seems warranted. However, it is hard to draw clear conclusions from
the discussion of Better Regulation, mainly because the characteristics of the
programme seem to support the rule of law at first sight, but turn out to be
problematic upon further exploration.
Impact assessment, with its social science and economic approaches of cost-
effectiveness and cost-benefit analysis, could increase predictability but it harbors
the danger of outsourcing public and political decisions to bureaucrats and experts
120 European Commission 2014, ‘2014 Revision of the European Commission Impact Assessment
Guidelines. Public Consultation document’, at http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/docs/iag_pc_
questionnaire_en.pdf. Accessed 17 February 2016.
121 Marxsen (2015).
122 Ibid., p. 278.
123 Brown and Scott (2011), pp. 479–480.
124 Compare Selznick et al. (1969).
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who perform impact assessments according to their own, technocratic, standards.125
The political use by other political actors such as the European Parliament may
alleviate the technocratic bias, but it may lead to a battle of the IAs similar to the
battle of the experts in court. The lack of a European demos or European citizenship
problematizes the idea of public consultation, and further thought needs to be given
to the problems (and possible ways of dealing with them) this generates in terms of
rule of law values in the context of European society.
Most elusive, but also most serious from a rule of law perspective, is the
background assumption that regulation needs to serve economic interests by being
cost-effective.126 Various aspects of this discourse add up to a pervasive logic in
which it is hard even to formulate the importance of other values. The way to
include rule of law values seems to be through politicizing the process, but this
creates a bias towards a democratic rule of law which may shortchange some of its
other aspects. This logic of economic rationalization also limits the possibility to
raise questions regarding the socio-legal context of Better Regulation, because the
diversity that comes with a contextual approach is understandably problematic when
standardization of regulatory procedures is the main goal. In this regard, the
political uses of IAs can be valued positively: questioning the appropriateness of an
IA may allow for the introduction of contextual factors in the discussion. On the
other hand, political uses of Better Regulation policies can also reduce discussions
to superficial attention, masking political power play.
5 Conclusion
The two examined EU instruments both refer to a rule of law concept, in which the
reduction of arbitrary use of power is recognizable. However, the translation of this
rule of law concept in the development of specific indicators and policies has taken
place in light of an underlying economic aim. The consequences of this combination
of distinctive legal values with economic purposes for the shaping of the
instruments is visible in the focus on quantifiable elements in the EU Justice
Scoreboard and the emphasis on impact assessments, and the input of experts in this
respect, in the Better Regulation programme. These particular aspects entail risks
for the realization of the rule of law in terms of the guarantee of judicial
independence and in terms of capture of regulatory processes by specific actors
respectively.
It seems that the European Commission and Council take the point of view that a
more robust guarantee of the rule of law through EU instruments is too ambitious as
an aim in the current phase of the process of legal integration in Europe and the
inherently political nature of this process.127 Regulating the justice systems of the
125 Compare Ambrus (2014), esp. Chs. 15–18.
126 For example, the OECD states ‘However, regulation should only proceed if it is expected to improve
society’s economic and social welfare’ (OECD 2008, Introductory Handbook for Undertaking Regulatory
Impact Analysis, at www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/44789472.pdf. Accessed 17 February 2016).
127 See also F. Timmermans, ‘The European Union and the Rule of Law’, speech Tilburg, 31 August
2015.
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EU uniformly is a particularly sensitive matter, and as experiences with the
European Arrest Warrant have shown cooperation in this area is difficult.128
However, the effectiveness of current rule of law initiatives, which emphasize the
role of dialogue, can be put into question with regard to Member States that
deliberately distance themselves from EU values. In this respect, the instrument of
the Justice Scoreboard requires further development, both concerning its production
and its application, in order to provide an adequate means for promoting the
realization of shared standards for justice systems in the EU. Better Regulation, too,
might not live up to the task at hand if its sole added value consists of serving as a
point of reference regarding the quality of regulation and as stimulating the
discussion on how to achieve this quality.
More specifically, a risk attached to the Justice Scoreboard is that the EU uses
scores to push through specific reforms in Member States or, vice versa, that
Member States highlight a good score on specific aspects of the Scoreboard to
downplay serious deficiencies concerning other aspects of their justice system. In
particular, good scores on efficiency should not be used to mask problems
concerning the guarantee of judicial independence. In a similar vein, reference to
the logics of Better Regulation might be used to mask deficiencies in public
consultation, resulting in the adoption of administratively sound rules which lack a
sufficient connection with the substantive values supported by European citizens.
With regard to contextualization, we recognize two forms. The Justice
Scoreboard aims to set standards for the Member States, allowing a differentiated
approach with regard to the implementation of these standards. By contrast, the
Better Regulation programme is aimed first of all at the EU itself and might have
additional effects on regulation policies in the Member States, but here a contextual
approach is not directly visible. Our idea is that different forms of contextualization
(geographical and other) need to be given shape to have meaningful contextual-
ization of the rule of law values. However, we also recognize that it is very difficult
to achieve contextualization for all Member States in the pan-European context. In
this respect, the warning given by Krygier and Selznick in rule of law theory retains
its relevance in practice. Therefore, limitations in this regard should be acknowl-
edged. Based on our analysis, both the experiences with the Justice Scoreboard and
with the Better Regulation programme clarify that the development of points of
reference for justice systems and legislation in the EU context could have an added
value, but is currently severely hampered by the influence of political interests and
the obvious difficulties in translating these points of reference into concrete
solutions and practices.
In sum, the analyzed EU monitoring instruments have potential to enhance the
quality of political debates at the EU level and between the EU and Member States.
In this way, these instruments could support the core notion of the rule of law
concerning the reduction of the arbitrary use of power. However, economic
assumptions and approaches underlying the monitoring instruments as well as
political interests influencing the interaction between the EU and the Member States
form a constant threat to the realization of the rule of law ideal.
128 Wolff (2013), p. 122.
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